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ABSTRACT This study analyzes the peace and reconciliation initiatives of the 
AK Party governments (2002 until 2017) to address the Kurdish Question, 
with a special focus on the Reconciliation Process. Steps taken throughout 
the Reconciliation Process and the strengths and weaknesses of these steps 
are discussed. It is argued that the main challenges and shortcomings were 
the shifting political priorities of the Kurdish political actors, the chang-
ing balance of power within Turkish domestic politics, new opportunities 
presented to the Kurdish Movement by the Syrian civil war and the un-
certainties Turkey faced due to this war. The main conclusion of the paper 
is that the regional turmoil, especially the ongoing civil wars in Syria and 
Iraq, is the major determinant that blocked the Reconciliation Process.
Introduction
The Kurdish Question has been one of the top priority items in domestic politics for the AK Party government. Some serious efforts were made and two major initiatives were conducted by successive AK Party gov-
ernments to address the Kurdish Question. The most serious effort was the 
Reconciliation Process (2013-2015). However earlier efforts paved the way for 
the Reconciliation Process. Erdoğan’s Diyarbakır speech in 2005 signaled a 
change of opinion on the issue. While, along with the Kurdish Opening (2009), 
some legal amendments and democratization efforts were made to address the 
problem. The Reconciliation Process (Çözüm Süreci) was only possible with 
the backdrop of these earlier efforts. This study analyzes the peace and recon-
ciliation initiatives of the AK Party governments (2002 until 2017) to address 
the Kurdish Question. More specific emphasis is on the Reconciliation Process 
or as it is known in Turkish the “Çözüm Süreci.” Steps taken throughout the 
Reconciliation Process and the strengths and weaknesses of these steps are 
discussed within the general logic of peace processes.
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Peace Process as a Notion
A peace process is defined as the active attempt for the prevention and man-
agement of conflict between and within states.1 The minimum requirements of 
a peace process involve the participation of the key protagonists in the process, 
cessation of violence, practicing political process and taking political steps 
that would prevent the reescalation of violence.2 According to John Darby and 
Roger Mac Ginty, five essential criteria are required for a successful peace ac-
cord: 1) The conflicting parties are willing to negotiate in good faith, 2) Key ac-
tors are included in the process, 3) The negotiations address the central issues 
in the dispute, 4) Force is not used to achieve objectives, 5) The negotiators are 
committed to a sustained process.3 
A peace process without the above-stated conditions has a very limited chance 
to be successful. A genuine peace process is different from ending an armed 
conflict or direct violence. Peace process is a comprehensive procedure that 
aims to focus on the social, economic, psychological and security-related as-
pects of the conflict. As Johan Gal-
tung expresses,4 ending the direct 
violence cannot be considered the 
ultimate purpose of the peace pro-
cess by any means. It can take a long 
while to overcome and deal with all 
the aspects of the conflict and such 
a comprehensive result can never 
be obtained in most conflicts. How-
ever as long as the violence factor 
continues, convenient grounds to 
enable progress in other realms cannot be formed. Reaching a result that in-
troduces social justice and consonance while meeting the expectations of all 
the conflicting parties as a result of negotiations might be the ideal solution. 
However, many negotiated peace agreements come to an end before achieving 
this ideal situation. 
The Reconciliation Process analyzed in this study refers to all the construc-
tive efforts to reach a solution that were displayed after the cease-fire with 
the aim of coming up with a political solution in the long-running Kurdish 
Question. The Reconciliation Process emerged as a comprehensive process 
that encompassed legal, social and economic dimensions of the problem. Pub-
lic diplomacy and communication strategies also comprised major elements 
of the process. Although a cease-fire was declared at the outset of the process, 
the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) units deployed in Turkish soil did not 
withdraw despite their promise to do so. During and prior to the Reconcil-
iation Process, a series of comprehensive legal regulations were carried out 
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towards the recognition of the rights Kurds requested.5 However, a consti-
tutional amendment regarding the local autonomy demands of the Kurdish 
National Movement6 was not brought to the agenda. Despite the drawbacks, 
the psychological and bureaucratic impediments to permanent peace were 
minimized during the Reconciliation Process. The atmosphere of peace and 
stability experienced throughout the process left positive traces in the collec-
tive memory of various societal segments in Turkey, particularly of the people 
living in southeast Turkey. Therefore, this process cannot be regarded as a 
complete failure. On the other hand, the new phase of conflict that erupted 
in July 2015 has dramatically changed the resolution model, leading to a new 
route map. 
From Kurdish Opening to Reconciliation Process
With his Diyarbakır speech on August 12, 2005, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan diverged significantly from the official discourses on the Kurdish 
issue. Erdoğan acknowledged the mistakes of the past governments on the 
Kurdish issue with the following quote: “there have been faults in the past and 
we are strong enough to solve these faults and questions.”7 Erdoğan also em-
phasized his commitment to resolve the “Kurdish Question” through democ-
ratization and economic progress. “Kurdish Problem is not just a problem of 
one part of this nation; it is a problem for all of them. It is also my problem… 
We will resolve this problem with more democracy, better citizenship rights 
and more wealth.”8 
Erdoğan’s speech in Diyarbakır in 2005 was a bold attempt because it was more 
difficult to express voices that contradicted with the official position on the 
issue at that time. In the early 2000’s the AK Party was still perceived more 
skeptically by the military and judicial establishment. It needs to be kept in 
mind that in 2005 the balance of power was in favor of the bureaucratic estab-
lishment and against the democratically elected AK Party government.
The first systematic peace initiative, which was termed the “democratic open-
ing” or “Kurdish Opening” (Demokratik Açılım / Kürt Açılımı) later referred 
to as the “project for national unity and fraternity” (milli birlik ve kardeşlik 
projesi) was launched in early 2009. However, this initiative was weakened 
after the provocative return of PKK militants to Turkey through the Habur 
Border Gate and came to an end after the PKK’s attack on the city of Tokat/
Reşadiye on December 7, 2009. The second initiative was called “Reconcili-
ation Process/Çözüm Süreci.” The Reconciliation Process started off with the 
Newroz declaration of Abdullah Öcalan in Newroz of 2013 (March 21). While 
the first initiative failed and the country entered a period of turbulence, the 
second initiative came to a halt due to the reignition of violence in July 2015. 
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The Kurdish Opening involved some dramatic changes in the Turkish govern-
ments’ approach to the Kurdish issue, which was backed by some key legisla-
tion. In return, the PKK was expected to disarm and leave Turkish territories. 
The Kurdish Opening was based on deliberative collective decision-making 
with the contribution of third parties9 and special emphasis was given to the 
public diplomacy and deliberation dimension of the peace process. While 
there was support for the Kurdish Opening at the bureaucratic level, the Turk-
ish public was more skeptical about the process. The Reconciliation Process 
was a top-down process, which involved negotiations between Öcalan, on be-
half of the Kurdish Nationalist Movement, and the Turkish State. This study 
argues that the Reconciliation Process emerged as a consequence of the Kurd-
ish Opening. 
The Kurdish Opening received its official name of “Democratic Opening: 
National Unity and Fraternity” in January 2010. The opening broadly con-
sidered the Kurdish problem from the perspectives of economic develop-
ment, democratization, and security. Pushing a security-based approach to 
the background for the first time, more equalizing and liberating promises 
were made in the political, economic, and social fields. The objectives and 
paths to be taken for the resolution of issues such as the establishment of 
a state approach respectful of rights and liberties in its attempt to prevent 
terrorism, becoming a citizen of the Turkish Republic, Turkish remaining 
as the official language but affording opportunities for other languages, dif-
ferences being regarded as cultural richness, preventing the feeling of “oth-
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ing Turkey’s integrity and unitary structure, and 
becoming a stronger country in the international 
arena were put forth.10 The Kurdish Opening pro-
cess had the presupposition that it would reach its 
goal of ending terrorism through the path of de-
mocratization. By developing fundamental rights 
and liberties, easing problems of identity, prevent-
ing discrimination, and establishing equal political 
participation, the opening aimed to institute na-
tional coalescence.11 
Throughout the Kurdish Opening process, import-
ant steps were taken on a legal basis in the area 
of democratization and an extensive negotiation 
platform was created inclusive of large sectors of 
society in terms of method. Through the medium 
of this platform, the creation of as big a support-
ing group as possible was attempted. The AK Party 
made it a priority to successfully launch the process and worked hard to 
achieve this.12
Some of the key legislation of the Kurdish Opening include: establishing an in-
dependent human rights institution; creation of a commission for complaints 
against Turkish security forces; legalization of election campaigns and propa-
ganda in languages other than Turkish; allowing prisoners to speak languages 
other than Turkish with their visitors; 24-hour private television stations to 
broadcast in languages other than Turkish; launching of official TRT 6 broad-
casts in Kurdish; approval to universities to teach the Kurdish and Zazaki lan-
guages; renaming of residential areas in line with demands from locals; and 
permission of access to social and religious services in languages other than 
Turkish.
The Context and Dynamics Underlying the Reconciliation Process 
On December 16, 2012, Hakan Fidan, the Chief of the Turkish National In-
telligence Organization (MİT), met the PKK’s imprisoned leader Abdullah 
Öcalan on İmralı Island, where Öcalan serves his sentence. Then Prime Min-
ister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared this meeting to the public two weeks later 
on December 29. On December 28, upon being questioned about the Kurdish 
issue with the query “Is there any meeting nowadays?” during a broadcasting 
aired by state-run TV station TRT, Erdoğan said “There are still some ongoing 
meetings since we have to obtain some results. As long as we can see a light, 
we will keep on taking steps for this sake. But we would cut off the meetings 
Although the process 
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to introduce peace 
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if there remains no light.” In January 2013, a delegation of the Peace and De-
mocracy Party (BDP) members headed to İmralı to meet Öcalan. This new 
peace initiative named the “Reconciliation Process” was coordinated with a 
focus on negotiating with Öcalan and therefore is also referred as the İm-
ralı Process by some. To end the conflict, a three-phased plan was developed 
which included:
• Phase One: Gradual withdrawal of PKK forces from Turkish soil 
• Phase Two: Democratic reforms from the Government side
• Phase Three: Integration of the PKK into political and civilian life following 
disarmament.13
Within this period, a series of negotiations were conducted with Öcalan 
through the medium of representatives. For the first time in the Republican 
history, the Turkish state openly admitted to having a direct contact with 
Öcalan while declaring an indirect contact with the Kurdish leadership in Qa-
ndil as well as Europe-based representatives of the PKK and the Kurdish Com-
munities Union (KCK), an umbrella organization that includes the PKK. The 
process also helped to legitimize the negotiations between the government and 
the political agents representing the PKK. During this period, normalization 
was observed in the region for the first time over the past 30 years. Most of the 
psychological impediments to peace were overcome during this process and 
this new atmosphere paved the way for genuine discussions that could really 
contribute to the permanent peace. 
The process came to an end on July 22, 2015, when the PKK shot two police 
officers in Ceylanpınar, Şanlıurfa. Following the Ceylanpınar attack, the level 
of violence escalated at a quick pace. Although the process was suspended in 
an unexpected way, it was marked as one of the most serious attempts to in-
troduce peace in the context of the Kurdish issue that has been ongoing for a 
century. The mentality of the Reconciliation Process was quite different from 
that of the Kurdish Initiative.14 But it can still be argued that the former was a 
significant forerunner of the latter. 
The Design of the Process and Communication Strategies 
March 21, 2013 is accepted as the unofficial commencement day of the Rec-
onciliation Process. During the Nevruz celebrations in Diyarbakır province 
on that day, a letter penned by Öcalan which called for a peaceful and demo-
cratic resolution to the Kurdish Question was read by then BDP deputy Sırrı 
Süreyya Önder. The letter read: “We have come to a point today where guns 
shall be silenced and thoughts and ideas shall speak. A modernist paradigm 
that ignores, denies and externalizes has collapsed. Blood is being shed from 
2017 Sprıng 145
RISE AND FALL OF THE AK PARTY’S KURDISH PEACE INITIATIVES
the heart of this land, regardless of 
whether it is from a Turk, Kurd, 
Laz or Circassian. A new era begins 
now; politics comes to the fore, not 
arms. Now it is time for our armed 
elements to move outside [Turkey’s] 
borders.”15 The letter underscored 
the brotherhood between Turks 
and Kurds. 
Following Öcalan’s letter, a unilat-
eral cease-fire was declared by the 
PKK on March 23. In May 2013, the PKK started withdrawing its forces within 
Turkey to Northern Iraq although ultimately only a limited proportion of its 
forces withdrew from Turkey.16 The withdrawal process halted in September 
2013 as the PKK expressed its disappointment on the pretext that the gov-
ernment failed to take adequate action in terms of promised reforms.17 So, 
the first phase of the process was never completed, which then obstructed the 
following phases. 
The process was built upon direct and indirect contacts with the leader of the 
Kurdish National Movement Öcalan, who was the primary agent of the en-
tire process. All the relevant actors were incorporated into the process by the 
Kurdish National Movement. Military operations were halted and the author-
ity to use special operation forces and military staff was assigned to civilian 
authorities and governors. The public was also included in the discussions by 
means of the Wise People Commission which was an attempt to prepare soci-
ety for the changes in policies and destination. The Wise People Commission 
(WPC), known in Turkish as the “Akil İnsanlar Heyeti” was formed in order to 
share the details of the peace process with the public and boost public support 
to the process. On April 3, 2013, then Prime Minister Erdoğan announced the 
list of the “wise people,” which consisted of 63 members (41 men and 12 wom-
en).18 The WPC dealt with a busy schedule of work for more than two months. 
The commission comprised seven groups that were active in seven regions of 
the country. 
The Commission was not formed just to expound the government’s plans 
to resolve the Kurdish Question to the public.19 It was designed as a gen-
uine civilian initiative and included public figures such as artists, writers, 
academics, civil society leaders, activists, etc. The Commission functioned 
as a public dialogue and deliberation mechanism endeavoring to grasp peo-
ple’s expectations from the Reconciliation Process and took note of people’s 
reservations and criticisms on the subject. The Commission had a consid-
erable public visibility during the course of its activities. The seven groups 
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significantly representatives 
of the opposition parties in the 
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Despite the efforts of the Wise Peo-
ple Commission, the process was 
not sufficiently conveyed to the 
public and significantly represen-
tatives of the opposition parties in 
the Parliament were not includ-
ed in the process. For this reason, 
there have been various criticisms 
regarding the comprehensiveness and transparency of the process. A num-
ber of political prisoners, imprisoned as part of the KCK trial were released 
during the process. Several critical legal arrangements were made to accom-
plish a political resolution. While an atmosphere that instilled hope was 
prevalent in the southeastern and eastern regions of the country, suspicion 
and reluctance prevailed in the other regions. Within this process, tourism 
and other economic activities also prospered from the effect of this positive 
atmosphere.20
The NGOs outside of the Kurdish National Movement, other political par-
ties, important leaders from different opinion groups and independent intel-
lectuals in the region were not included in the process. In fact, these groups 
complained about the pressure that the Kurdish National Movement exerted 
on them. So, the process only encompassed the main parties of the conflict. 
These groups also stated that the process led to a consolidation of the Kurdish 
National Movement while excluding all the other major political agents. The 
security measures became less visible and there was an impression suggest-
ing that a vacuum emerged in public security throughout the process. Taking 
advantage of this vacuum, the armed wings of the movement increased their 
military build-up. They formed urban youth branches including the Patriotic 
Revolutionist Youth Movement (YDG-H) and trained them to organize up-
risings in cities. In addition the municipalities run by the Kurdish National 
Movement’s offshoot Democratic Regions Party (DBP), aided the organiza-
tion’s military build-up activities to a great extent.21 During this period, public 
funds were misused to pile up military equipment for terrorists. Police and 
military officers wavered in intervening in some actions of the organization 
that went against the logic of the peace process so as not to undermine the 
continuity of the process. 
The AK Party government was accused of not displaying the required sensi-
tivity towards the feelings of Kurds in the context of the Syrian Kurds’ fight 
Considering the campaigns 
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election that was held in August 
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encompassed all the Turkish 
electorate by employing a 
strategic language of resistance 
against Erdoğan
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against ISIS forces in Kobani (Ayn al-Arab). This claim of insensitivity paved 
the way for the propaganda alleging that the AK Party government is an ally 
of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) and al-Nusra terrorist groups in 
Syria. The Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) and the PKK figures actively ma-
nipulated this claim as a propaganda tool and the AK Party failed to convince 
Kurds about the baselessness of these accusations. Most of the Turkish people 
were not yet ready for such a grand policy shift. Some debates arguing that 
the AK Party government did not adequately consider the Kurdish National 
Movement’s expectations and sensitivities during the Syrian civil war came to 
the agenda. However, during the same period, thousands of Syrian Kurds who 
fled from the (ISIS) threat in Kobani safely took shelter in Turkish territories.22 
As can be seen, the civil war ongoing in Syria stood out as the biggest obstacle 
to the Reconciliation Process. 
Changes During the Reconciliation Process
There were two main reasons underlying the decline of the Reconciliation Pro-
cess: The first one is the constant increase of the Kurdish National Movement’s 
expectations throughout the process. It eventually became very difficult for 
the government to meet their growing demands. The Kurdish National Move-
ment’s expectations rose at a quick pace in the face of a series of developments 
including the Gezi Park protests, the December 17-25 judicial coup attempt 
plotted by Gülenist terror group (FETÖ) that tried to charge several AK Party 
ministers with corruption, changing balances of power in the Syrian civil war 
and the advance of the PKK’s Syrian offshoot. The balance of powers turned 
against the government throughout the process. Some groups even argued that 
Erdoğan and the AK Party would lose their grip. 
Secondly, the electoral period in Turkey undermined the atmosphere re-
quired for peace negotiations and polarized the political circles in the coun-
try even further. Since controversial political issues are brought to the agenda 
more intensively during electoral periods, such periods can escalate polit-
ical tensions. For this reason, political agents from many countries across 
the world abstain from bringing highly-debated issues such as peace pro-
cesses to the agenda during electoral periods. Nevertheless, different agents 
within the Kurdish National Movement issued discordant messages to the 
public while the government tried to be more consistent. The AK Party elec-
torate approached the process skeptically; in fact the process even sparked 
nationalistic tendencies within the party. While Erdoğan and the AK Party 
led and motivated the party base to continue with the process, a part of the 
AK Party electorate swung to the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) as a re-
sponse to the Reconciliation Process. The Kurdish National Movement seized 
the period of loosened security measures as a golden opportunity to store 
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up weapons and reorganize its militants for urban warfare. Easier access to 
weapons due to the Syrian civil war and the international legitimacy enjoyed 
by the PKK’s Syrian offshoot Democratic Union Party (PYD), thanks to its 
fight against ISIS led to the consideration of other alternatives. The Kurdish 
National Movement at that stage started to aim for a cantonal structure based 
on establishing self-rule. 
The Kurdish National Movement’s Dilemma: Being Integrated to 
Turkey or the Middle East? 
Considering the campaigns towards the presidential election that was held in 
August 2014, the HDP endeavored to build a rhetoric that encompassed all the 
Turkish electorate by employing a strategic language of resistance against Er-
doğan. The party’s electoral campaigns put emphasis on Kurdish nationalism 
in eastern and southeastern regions while opposition to Erdoğan was high-
lighted in the other regions. The HDP’s campaign can be said to have been a 
success since the party passed the 10 percent election threshold in the general 
elections held in June 2015 and November 2015. But this achievement does 
not necessarily mean that they reached their objective to become an integral 
part of Turkey’s political and social dynamics.23 This policy was a significant 
move for the Kurdish National Movement since it indicated that the move-
ment would try to achieve their goals through political means and exert efforts 
to be integrated into Turkish society by addressing the people that are not part 
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of the Kurdish political movement. However, one of the most critical mistakes 
made in peace processes in general is the effort to render the protagonists of 
the process illegitimate. The Kurdish National Movement and the HDP disre-
garded the peace process parameters with their efforts to represent President 
Erdoğan as an illegitimate figure although he was their primary interlocutor in 
the process. This plunge, which was firstly interpreted as a reflection of politi-
cal pragmatism, ultimately became one of the main reasons that sharpened the 
lack of trust between the main actors and put the process to an end. The PKK, 
meanwhile, changed its strategic priority towards being an influential regional 
actor in the Middle East in the presence of the authority gap caused by the 
decline of the Assad regime in Syria. The PKK sought to take advantage of this 
authority gap caused by the civil wars in Syria and Iraq and the West’s climbing 
concerns over ISIS. Within this perspective, the PKK started to position itself 
as a regional actor in the Middle East. 
Changing Goals and the Kurdish National Movement’s Rising 
Expectations 
As the PKK started committing terror attacks as of July 2015 and the party 
officials failed to maintain a distance to the PKK’s assaults, the HDP’s claims 
of efforts to be integrated into Turkey were overshadowed. The HDP co-chairs 
Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ supported the demands of “demo-
cratic autonomy” and “self-rule” that was declared by the Democratic Society 
Congress (DTK) on December 27, 2015.24 The HDP’s endeavors to be inte-
grated into Turkey were undermined by the clashes between Turkish security 
forces and the PKK. 
In the general election held in June 2015, the AK Party lost its parliamentary 
majority as the Kurdish electorate swung to the HDP while the Turkish na-
tionalists predominantly opted for the MHP.25 The Kurdish support to the AK 
Party declined not only in eastern and southeastern regions, but also in met-
ropolitan cities including İstanbul, İzmir and Adana. The Reconciliation Pro-
cess played a central role in this change and was used as a tool to solidify the 
unofficial networks affiliated with the HDP and the PKK. On the other hand, 
the nationalist Turks were disturbed by the peace process conducted with the 
PKK, which led them to swing to the MHP. 
The HDP’s endeavors to be integrated 
into Turkey were undermined by the 




Elections and the Deceleration of the Reconciliation Process 
Up until July 2015, when the PKK exacerbated its assaults again which led to 
the suspension of the Reconciliation Process, there were hopes to restructure 
the political dynamics in Turkey.26 Peace processes do generally have complex 
and volatile characteristics, and the parties involved in the process draw a great 
deal of lessons from past experiences, especially from their mistakes and ac-
complishments.27 As a matter of fact, election periods are not convenient times 
to carry out peace processes since political polarizations always better serve 
the interests of political leaders seeking to increase their vote share. Despite 
that, the Reconciliation Process in Turkey did not come to an end, but was 
decelerated, throughout the electoral campaigns.
Soon after the June 2015 general election, a new wave of insurrections broke 
out in July, which marked the end of the Reconciliation Process. Three major 
developments jeopardized the process: the rising expectations of the Kurdish 
National Movement, the de facto autonomy of the PYD in the north Syria, and 
Demirtaş and the HDP’s efforts to defame President Erdoğan. The AK Party, 
on the other hand, decelerated the Reconciliation Process during the electoral 
campaign period as a response to the criticisms of the conservative and na-
tionalist Turkish electorate and the concerns of its conventional base. 
During the Syrian civil war, the AK Party’s foreign policy disappointed a 
certain proportion of the Kurdish population in Turkey. Although the gov-
ernment expressed that it expected the PYD to act in line with the mod-
erate opponents in the Syrian civil war, the PYD most of the time acted in 
parallel to the regime’s forces. The government’s criticisms in this respect 
were represented as an antagonism against Kurds within the HDP base. This 
propaganda addressed the base of the Kurdish movement. Meanwhile, the 
government’s reluctance to get directly involved in the clashes ongoing in 
Kobani between ISIS and the PYD’s armed wing, namely the People’s Pro-
tection Units (YPG), led to rising criticisms towards the AK Party amongst 
the Kurds in Turkey. Such developments raised the expectations of Kurdish 
political actors. 
Shifting Balances of Power between Protagonists 
During the Reconciliation Process, the domestic political context in Turkey 
and the situation in Syria changed dramatically, which led to the shifting of 
the balance of power between the main interlocutors of the process. The AK 
Party was at the peak of its power and legitimacy when the Reconciliation 
Process was initiated, whereas the PKK was in a very weak position. After this 
referendum Erdoğan started to take bolder steps along their political reform 
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agenda. The AK Party won the 2011 
parliamentary elections with the 
support of almost the half of the 
Turkish electorate and this wide 
margin (49.5 percent) in its third 
term boosted its confidence. At the 
same time in the early stages of the 
“Arab Spring,” the AK Party expe-
rience was presented as an ideal 
model for the MENA countries and the party with its leader Erdoğan gained 
international recognition and popularity. Whereas the PKK was in a very weak 
position with its plans to initiate uprising and autonomy in Şemdinli failed due 
to the Turkish security forces’ stiff rebuff. 
The AK Party started to have some serious challenges in both domestic pol-
itics and in its MENA policy starting from mid-2014, while the escalation of 
the civil war in Syria provided new opportunities for the PKK. Following the 
Gezi Park protests and the December 17-25 judicial coup attempt plotted by 
FETÖ, the PKK and the HDP came to regard the government and Erdoğan as 
the disadvantaged party of the negotiations.28 It was later seen that this was a 
faulty evaluation to make in such a volatile process. While Öcalan seemed to 
conduct a series of large-scale negotiations with the AK Party government on 
behalf of the Kurdish National Movement, other agents within the Kurdish po-
litical movement seized the fluctuations in the AK Party government’s power 
as a new opportunity to strengthen their influence on the table. Their interests 
during the Reconciliation Process were not completely in line with the position 
they obtained in the new order of power relations in the Middle East led by 
the Syrian civil war. The PKK leaders’ criticisms and accusations that targeted 
the AK Party and Erdoğan after the June election demonstrated the PKK’s new 
position and rising self-confidence. For instance, during an interview he gave 
to the BBC, senior PKK figure Cemil Bayık blamed Erdoğan for backing ISIS 
atrocities and trying to prevent the acquisitions of territory by Kurds.29 Duran 
Kalkan, another senior figure of the PKK, also accused Erdoğan of disrupting 
the peace process.30
The Gezi Park protests posed a major challenge to the AK Party by mobiliz-
ing identity-related polarizations in Turkey. During the protests, attempts were 
made to split Turkish society by agitating some binary opposites such as secu-
lar-conservative, AK Party proponent-AK Party dissident, Alevi-Sunni and so 
on. The protests started two months after the initiation of the Reconciliation 
Process.31 Therefore, the Kurdish National Movement was reluctant to join the 
demonstrations. In particular the left wing of the Kurdish National Movement 
criticized the PKK and the HDP since they both decided not to get directly in-
volved in the protests. Despite confronting serious challenges such as the Gezi 
The PKK leaders’ criticisms and 
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AK Party and Erdoğan after the 
June election demonstrated the 




Park protests and the December 
17-25 incidents, the AK Party gov-
ernment and Erdoğan maintained 
their robust positions. The leaders 
of the Kurdish movement wavered 
between making use of the vul-
nerability of the government and 
continuing with the peace process. 
New data demonstrating collabo-
ration between FETÖ and the PKK 
can also shed light on the vulnera-
bility of that period. The movement 
raised its expectations from the Reconciliation Process regardless of their 
positions. This change encouraged the PKK to exacerbate its violent acts and 
form an armed militia named the Patriotic Revolutionist Youth Movement 
(YDG-H)32 with the aim of stirring urban insurrections in some southeastern 
cities to declare autonomy. 
Shaking of the Regional Order and the Alternative to Negotiations 
The second factor that raised the Kurdish National Movement’s expectations 
was the on-going civil war in Syria. The PYD and the YPG obtained some po-
litical advantages and domination over the cantons of Afrin, Jazira and Kobani 
located in northern Syria. Despite the HDP’s criticisms towards Turkey due 
to the Kobani blockade kicked off in September 2014, the PYD was not in a 
position to defend Kobani without external support, including the support of 
Turkey. The PYD ended the humanitarian crisis in Kobani with the aid of the 
Peshmerga forces of the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), who 
went to Kobani by passing through Turkish territory. Significantly, the fight-
ers who were wounded during the blockade were treated in Turkish hospitals 
while thousands of Kurdish civilians who fled from the siege took shelter in 
Turkey.33 
ISIS’s siege of Kobani fueled the ethnic-nationalist consciousness among the 
Kurds in Turkey. Both the PKK and the HDP used the Kobani fight to move 
towards their internal mobilization goals. The climbing tension due to Kobani 
and the accusations against Turkey alleging that the Turkish government sup-
ported ISIS resulted in the October 6-8 incidents,34 during which more than 
50 Turkish citizens were killed. The PYD’s fight against ISIS also contributed to 
the international legitimacy of the organization. The acquisitions in Syria were 
valorized as an epic victory especially by the younger generations of Kurds. 
The regional autonomy in the north of Syria also raised the hopes and expec-
tations of founding an “independent and united Kurdistan.” 
The PYD obtained wide 
international support and 
military aid as it successfully 
managed to turn its resistance 
to ISIS and struggle against 
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The PYD obtained wide international support and military aid as it success-
fully managed to turn its resistance to ISIS and struggle against a “rogue state” 
into an international propaganda campaign. Especial attention was focused on 
the “women warriors” of the movement who were widely portrayed in leading 
international news sources.35 In addition to that, the international military aid 
provided to the PYD enhanced the capacity of the PKK, rendering the or-
ganization more powerful against Turkish security forces. The discourse and 
ideology of the ethnic-nationalist resistance built against ISIS mainly targeted 
the AK Party. The PKK manipulated the antagonism of younger generations 
of Kurds and steered their anger towards the AK Party. The government, on 
the other hand, failed to grasp the sensitivities of Kurdish ethnic-nationalism 
in Syria. 
The De-legitimization of Parties and Problems of Loyalty 
The third factor that raised the HDP’s political expectations was the party co-
chair Demirtaş’s36 electoral campaign for the 2014 Presidential Election. Pull-
ing in a considerable amount of support from the young population in met-
ropolitan cities with his anti-Erdoğan discourse, Demirtaş received around 
four million votes, which corresponded to 9.78 percent of the total.37 As this 
result instilled Demirtaş with self-confidence, he decided to maintain his an-
ti-Erdoğan focus following the election instead of adopting a new political dis-
course. Demirtaş’s motto was: “We will not make you [Erdoğan] president.”38 
The HDP enjoyed a substantial support with the effect of this campaign. 
The Syrian civil war and the PYD’s success in its fight against ISIS helped the 
PKK and the PYD become substantial actors in the turbulent atmosphere of 
the Middle East. While consolidating their legitimacy on the international are-
na by defaming the Islamist agents in the region, the PYD and the PKK repre-
sented the AK Party as a supporter of these agents.39 Although their political 
and parliamentary representative, namely the HDP, exerted efforts to be inte-
grated into Turkey, the PKK aspired to become an important component of 
the Middle East equation. The PKK proved once again that it is the dominant 
agent in the Kurdish National Movement by giving up the Reconciliation Pro-
cess due to its Pan-Kurdist agenda. This choice jeopardized the HDP’s political 
strategy of being integrated into Turkey. 
The results obtained in the general elections held in June 2015 and November 
2015 showed that the HDP is likely to be an important and consistent agent 
of Turkish politics in years to come.40 Despite having a slight decline in its 
vote share in the November election, the party’s vote rate was still regarded 
as successful. Both domestic and international conjunctures were effective in 
this result. Demirtaş gained advantage from Gezi Park protests and the ris-
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ing opposition to Erdoğan. On the other hand, the 
conflicts in Iraq and Syria, and Kurds’ resistance to 
ISIS in these countries consolidated the legitimacy 
of Kurdish agents in the Middle East. The HDP’s ef-
forts to evolve from an ethno-centric party to a “na-
tional” one had been successful to a certain extent 
until the PKK restarted its violent attacks in July 
2015. 
All in all, the HDP’s rhetoric of identity politics 
increased the party’s election performance but the 
PKK attacks constituted a great impediment to this 
performance. It is difficult to regard the HDP and 
the PKK as completely separate entities, but it is ap-
parent that the PKK’s objectives and regional ambi-
tions posed a major obstacle to the progress of the 
HDP as an autonomous political actor. While the 
HDP tried to improve its position as a legitimate 
political actor that would be a serious candidate to 
attract the popular support from all sections of Turkish society “Türkiyeli-
leşme,” the PKK sought to be a regional actor within the turbulent Middle 
East (Middle Easternization). Ultimately, the PKK, which was the actor hav-
ing the final word, hampered the Reconciliation Process. The PKK and the 
HDP tried to turn the societal support they enjoyed during this period into 
a civil insurrection. Due to the PKK’s presence in Syria, it was possible for 
the international community to favor such an insurrection. However, these 
plans did not appeal to the local population of the region and the PKK was 
completely defeated in its trench and barricade strategies and urban warfare 
attempts. 
Declining Trust and the Lack of Third Parties 
The Reconciliation Process generated an excitement particularly amongst the 
Kurdish population in Turkey. In the eastern and southeastern regions, the 
hopes to achieve a sustained peace were raised. Since the entities and actors 
affiliated with the Kurdish National Movement were chosen as the main coun-
terpart, the Kurds that are not affiliated with the movement felt left out. For the 
Kurdish National Movement, on the other hand, the Reconciliation Process 
and the developments in Syria, particularly the PYD’s acquisitions towards au-
tonomy, caused a distinct eagerness to build a nation. 
The majority of Turkish people approached the Reconciliation Process with 
suspicion but the AK Party governments’ devotion to the process had a pos-
As the “Dolmabahçe 
Agreement” between 
the government and 
the HDP delegations 
could not be well 
managed, the 
trust between the 
parties was shaken 
even more while 
the public started 
to question the 
transparency of the 
process
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itive impact on public support. Despite all concerns, people were happy with 
the cease-fire between the security forces and the PKK. As the process did 
not have transparency in general, the leaders of both parties played a major 
role in convincing their own base, however, the opposition parties and NGOs 
remained skeptical of the process due to this lack of transparency. They asked 
to be informed about the process many times yet they were unable to get the 
expected information. The Wise People Commission played a significant role 
throughout the process; however, it had a unidirectional communication strat-
egy that did not include explaining the general mindset and details of the Rec-
onciliation Process to citizens. 
Many incidents undermined the mutual trust between the AK Party govern-
ment and the Kurdish National Movement, which rendered the Reconciliation 
Process even more complex. The October 6-8 incidents created serious suspi-
cions within the government regarding the intentions of the movement. More 
than 50 people were killed during this tumult while many schools, libraries and 
other public properties were destroyed. The degree of vandalism and violence 
witnessed in the incidents shocked the AK Party government and incensed 
Turkish people. In addition, the withdrawal of PKK militants from Turkish 
territories had never reached the desired level. In the meantime, the PKK was 
building and training its youth branches, namely YDG-H and YDG-J, pre-
paring them for an urban insurrection. The armament in some southeastern 
cities or districts climbed to a critical level. Having access to weapons became 
easier due to the ongoing civil wars and clashes in Syria and Iraq with Tur-
key’s southern border suffering from serious security lapses allowing infiltra-
tion of fighters and armaments. These factors prepared a suitable ground for 
the PKK’s return to violence with some municipalities run by the DBP or the 
The people of 
Diyarbakır were 
once more free 
to sit in front of 
the Great Mosque 
after the curfew 
was lifted in 
March 2016.




HDP being complicit in facilitating 
weapon storage. 
According to the Kurdish National 
Movement’s point of view, the AK 
Party’s antagonistic approach to the 
PYD contradicted the objectives of 
the Reconciliation Process and the 
general framework of the recon-
ciliation efforts between the Turkish government and the Kurdish National 
Movement. During this period, constitutional amendments that would meet 
their expectations of a liberal democratic constitution were not achieved. The 
government did not openly recommend a road map for legislative regulations 
regarding the Kurdish National Movement’s regional autonomy demands. 
The Kurdish National Movement representatives accused the government of 
undermining the process by denying the “Dolmabahçe Agreement.” Howev-
er, President Erdoğan has never recognized such an agreement. Erdoğan ex-
pressed that the claimed gathering of two parties at Dolmabahçe Palace was 
not true. He also expressed his concerns in that the monitoring commission 
might be abused.41 Erdoğan also remarked that the Reconciliation Process en-
compassed 78 million citizens and interested everyone in Turkey. 
On February 28, 2015, a delegation of HDP members consisting of Sırrı 
Süreyya Önder, İdris Baluken and Pervin Buldan met with a delegation of 
government officials leaded by then Deputy Prime Minister Yalçın Akdoğan. 
Akdoğan and Önder read their statements in the meeting. According to some 
news sources, Önder listed 10 articles that summarized Öcalan’s priorities.42 
President Erdoğan denied it by saying, “I do not recognize the phrase ‘Dolma-
bahçe Agreement.’ There is a government and there is a political party with its 
grassroots [from the PKK]. If there is a step to take for the future of our coun-
try, this should be made in parliament. There cannot be an agreement with a 
political party that is being supported by a terrorist organization.” 
Erdoğan said: “There is not a democracy call on this 10 articled text. How 
could this text be associated with democracy? When examined closely, it can 
be seen that most of the topics within the text do not have anything to do with 
democracy. And still, new demands are coming up. A statement was issued 
by the Deputy Prime Minister, which is the direct opposite of their claims. So, 
there is no matching data. Then what did they discuss? Can you call it a joint 
declaration? Is there such a thing?”43
As the “Dolmabahçe Agreement” between the government and the HDP del-
egations could not be well managed, the trust between the parties was shaken 
even more while the public started to question the transparency of the process. 
Unlike the situation in the 
1990s, the Kurdish Question 
evolved into a region wide 
problem particularly due to the 
civil wars ongoing in Iraq and 
Syria
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Eventually, this matter has been a tangible example illustrating some deficien-
cies of the Reconciliation Process. The lack of transparency, the conflicts in the 
agendas of the two parties and the fact that the public was not yet ready for the 
process stood out as several important factors that blocked the process. 
The Reasons Underlying the Failure of the Reconciliation Process
There are many interrelated reasons underlying the failure of the Kurdish ini-
tiative and the Reconciliation Process. Aside from the fluctuations in Turkey’s 
domestic politics, the uncertainties in the region, the influence of important 
regional actors, and the competition and disputes among senior figures of the 
Kurdish National Movement also lead to the failure. The relative success of 
both processes cannot be denied; however, they failed to reach their ultimate 
goals of a long-term cease-fire and introducing a permanent solution to the 
Kurdish Question in Turkey. Unlike the situation in the 1990s, the Kurdish 
Question evolved into a region wide problem particularly due to the civil wars 
ongoing in Iraq and Syria. This factor also formed an invisible resilience to 
resolving the problem only through the initiative of Turkey. International ac-
tors did not side with Turkey’s solving the issue with its unilateral initiative. 
Ultimately, Turkey preferred to carry out the process through its own initiative 
but the lack of international support stood out as one of the main deficiencies 
of the process. 
It is hardly possible to evaluate each individual reason separately and deter-
mine which factor was more influential in the failure of the process. To sum 
up, the factors listed below stand out as the main reasons:
1) The public, especially the conservative Turks, were not yet mentally ready 
for the process.
2) The PKK trained and prepared its youth branches for an urban insurrection 
by means of its political offshoots.
3) The mobilization capacity, political opportunities and self-confidence of the 
PKK increased more than expected due to the Syrian civil war and loosened 
security in the region.
4) The Kurdish National Movement raised its political expectations and objec-
tives during the process with the effect of its rising mobilization capacity.
5) The PKK leaders in Qandil failed to undergo the intellectual transforma-
tion required for peace. In addition they were engaged in an intra party 
competition with the political leaders affiliated with the HDP and the DBP.
6) The balances of power between the government and the Kurdish National 
Movement showed a change throughout the process.
7) Some problems of mutual trust and safety emerged due to the lack of a me-
diator, monitoring body or an exercising authority. 
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The predominant factor in the fail-
ure of the Kurdish initiative was 
the absence of societal readiness. 
As part of the Kurdish initiative, 
creating a feasible atmosphere to 
ensure more substantial steps were 
attempted. Therefore, public dis-
cussions constituted a consider-
able component of the process. The 
Kurdish initiative was a process that 
formed the grounds of direct nego-
tiation efforts. This endeavor could not avert the conflicts but still achieved a 
number of positive changes. The initiative necessitated a paradigm shift in the 
official view on the Kurdish Question. For the first time, the official agents rec-
ognized that the Kurdish Question is not simply a terrorism or violence prob-
lem, and alternative approaches other than security-focused measures must be 
employed in this regard. 
The discussions yielded some results in official and elite segments but failed 
to achieve a transformation in grassroots. The ceasing of terror attacks and 
the decline in losses of life and property were the major factors that convinced 
the public. However, the vulnerabilities in terms of violence lead to a general 
confusion in society and the expected mutual trust was never fully established. 
The AK Party also could not sufficiently persuade its own base of the necessity 
of the process. In particular the AK Party electorate in Central and Western 
Anatolia kept the alternative solutions to the issue at a distance. Furthermore, 
the relative legitimization of political agents affiliated with the Kurdish Nation-
al Movement lead some Kurdish AK Party proponents to swing to the HDP. 
The swing votes also accentuated the AK Party base’s critical approach to the 
Reconciliation Process. 
The legal steps that reformed the individual and group rights of Kurdish cit-
izens were also marked as important moderating steps. They fell short of re-
solving the Kurdish Question, but a great change has occurred in the stances of 
official agents. Since the AK Party government publicly abstained from accept-
ing the main representative of the Kurdish National Movement as an interloc-
utor during the Kurdish initiative, it was seen as a one-sided initiative. It can 
also be argued that the lack of trust between the parties escalated during this 
period. The Kurdish Initiative was subjected to heavy criticisms due to the way 
the PKK militants were greeted when they surrendered at the Habur Border 
Gate to Iraq and the government could not avert the wave of public criticisms. 
Considering this drawback of the Kurdish Initiative, the dimension of public 
diplomacy was taken into account in a more comprehensive way during the 
Reconciliation Process. 
Compared to the Kurdish 
Initiative, the Reconciliation 
Process was a more 
comprehensive and assertive 
process that sought a 
sustainable solution to the 
Kurdish Question
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Compared to the Kurdish Initiative, the Reconciliation Process was a more 
comprehensive and assertive process that sought a sustainable solution to the 
Kurdish Question. Unlike the Kurdish Initiative, the Process was based on 
the direct negotiation of key primary parties. The phases of the process had 
been roughly outlined beforehand and the ultimate goal was designated as dis-
arming the PKK and ending the period of armed conflict. Despite the serious 
disturbance within its own base, the AK Party government took major risks 
throughout the process. Although the Wise People Commission played a role 
in the public diplomacy aspect of the Reconciliation Process, both parties fell 
short of convincing their own societal bases to support the new situation. 
Furthermore, a divergence was observed between the HDP and the PKK. The 
HDP’s political achievements lead to uneasiness within the armed wing of the 
organization. The PKK leadership wished to take precedence over the HDP, 
which stood out as the representative of the Kurdish movement through the 
process. A confusion prevailed in the Kurdish political and societal realms. 
The armed agents had the final word with regard to the future of the process 
and they did not want to change this status. A similar confusion was also ob-
served in the base of the ruling party. The ruling party had difficulty in ex-
plaining the importance of the process to its own base. The AK Party’s popular 
base has always approached the process skeptically. As a result, a solid social 
support that would balance the political fluctuations and flaws and contribute 
to peace was not achieved. If a comprehensive orientation program addressing 
the public had been conducted and the public had been conditioned to the 
idea of permanent peace, society might have been more disappointed by the 
eventual failure of the process. This is one of the paradoxes observed in the 
socialization of peace processes. 
The mobilization capacity of the PKK militants increased with the internation-
al political and military support to the PYD and the easy access to sophisticated 
weapon systems in Syria. Thus the PKK had a chance to reorganize itself in ur-
ban areas due to the relaxed security environment. The KCK also intensified its 
political endeavors in urban centers during the same period. The atmosphere 
created thanks to the Reconciliation Process enabled a convenient environment 
for the PKK and the KCK to pile up weaponry and ammunition and run their 
political propaganda more freely. The appearance of such a convenient envi-
ronment also encouraged the hawkish wing of the organization. The relaxed 
security measures during the process were misinterpreted by the organization 
as a chance to increase their mobilization. The sudden and sharp decline in the 
visibility and influence of the state’s security forces increased the opportunities 
and mobilization resources of the PKK thus encouraging an urban insurgency. 
The availability of the atmosphere and resources required for feasibility and 
insurrection is considered among the most important factors that can mo-
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bilize conflict within the literature of civil wars and ethnic conflicts.44 Peace 
processes normally function with the presumption that the parties approach 
to the process in good faith. Therefore, the conflicting parties are expected to 
pursue more constructive behaviors and strategies during the process. If the 
ambiguities in terms of security are abused by parties, the process can easily 
go wrong and irreparable tensions will arise between the parties. The PKK and 
the KCK abused the feasible atmosphere caused by the Reconciliation Pro-
cess and the situation in Syria. During the process, the organization stockpiled 
weapons and ammunition while accelerating its ideological activities towards 
the youth. In addition, the Kurdish National Movement figures interpreted the 
state’s constructions of dams and Turkish military stations called “kalekol” in 
the course of the process as malevolent and threatening steps. The construc-
tion sites and companies building the kalekols and dams were subjected to 
arson attacks by the organization. The state’s kalekol constructions and efforts 
to block the supply points of the organization stirred reactions and criticisms 
within the PKK. 
The HDP’s success in the June 2015 general election and the PYD’s de facto 
autonomy in the north of Syria affected the PKK. Hoping to expand the auton-
omous canton system into Turkish territories, on August 12, 2015, the KCK 
declared self-rule in some 12 districts of Turkey. The KCK’s influential propa-
ganda, public diplomacy and mobilization efforts influenced this result and, 
following this declaration, nationalist tendencies climbed among both Turks 
and Kurds. The HDP’s success in the political realm did not mean that the 
violent actions of the Kurdish National Movement were condoned but despite 
this the party took advantage of the new situation created by the Reconcili-
ation Process. Meanwhile, the PKK’s acquisitions in northern Syria and the 
HDP’s success in politics rapidly raised the Kurdish National Movement’s ex-
pectations from the process. It was hard to meet their rising expectations only 
through the negotiations since they were interpreting their own acquisitions as 
a weakness in the opposing party, the Turkish government. 
The Reconciliation Process was not maintained with a distinct outline and 
route map, which was one of the significant deficiencies of the process. The 
government planned to make a series of reforms that would allow democra-
tization and universal standards of group rights in the context of the Kurdish 
Question and in return expected the absolute cessation of the PKK’s armed 
conflict. The Kurdish National Movement, on the other hand, was in the pur-
suit of a political status, which would grant them a certain extent of agency. 
This pursuit was at a point situated between federalism/autonomy and inde-
pendence. The PYD’s de facto autonomy in some cantons of northern Syria 
gave them the confidence to believe they could expand their autonomy in-
side Turkish territories. The expectations oscillated since the route map and 
negotiation positions were not explicitly determined. As it became clear that 
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converging the two parties onto the same point was 
nearly impossible, the Qandil leaned towards the 
Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BAT-
NA). As a result the wave of violence and terror on-
going over the past two years has led to a crisis of 
trust that is hard to overcome and has rendered such 
a step almost impossible. 
The Gezi Park protests, the December 17-25 judi-
cial coup attempt, the AK Party’s loss of its parlia-
mentary majority in the June election, and the AK 
Party government’s much criticized Syria policy 
due to its consequences were among the important 
developments that undermined the AK Party. Of 
international significance is the fact that Erdoğan, 
the former Prime Minister and current President 
since 2014, has been subjected to various criticisms 
due to the above-mentioned accusations and his 
stance towards the Arab Spring. Erdoğan and the AK Party have been con-
fronting a consistent and widespread defamation campaign in the interna-
tional arena. 
The PYD, meanwhile, represented itself as the only secular agent fighting 
against ISIS and al-Nusra Front in the Syrian civil war. The legitimization of 
the PYD particularly by the Western countries also strengthened the PKK’s 
legitimacy and position. Until the reelections held in November 2015, the 
image and power of the AK Party government declined while the PYD and 
the PKK enjoyed being represented as an “antidote” to ISIS. The success 
of the HDP both in June and November elections also boosted the party’s 
self-confidence. 
The absence of a monitoring body was another reason underlying the fail-
ure of the process. The Reconciliation Process was kicked off with a great 
excitement displayed by both parties but it did not meet the main expecta-
tions of the agents. The parties blamed each other for not sticking to their 
commitments throughout the process. The PKK did not completely withdraw 
its militants from Turkish soil while the militants in urban areas were not 
disarmed. The absence of a third party that would monitor the allegiance to 
disarmament and other commitments was among the greatest deficiencies of 
the process. 
Instead of withdrawing its militants out of Turkey, the PKK formed an orga-
nization named YDG-H/ YDG-J, which drew on young people with an aim to 
stir an urban insurrection. The AK Party government’s denial of the Dolma-
Although the 
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came to a de facto 
end, it is yet projected 
to be in a phase of 
stalemate but might 
be re-initiated with 
a different logic 




bahçe meetings disappointed the Kurdish National Movement. The presence 
of a third party as a monitoring organ could have enhanced the transparen-
cy of the process. The third party could also have made great contributions 
to overcoming the commitment problems between the government and the 
Kurdish National Movement. Besides, a controllable and staged process man-
agement might have yielded more productive and permanent results. Such 
deficiencies in the design of the process resulted in a crisis within the peace 
talks. 
Conclusion
Although the Reconciliation Process came to a de facto end, it is yet projected 
to be in a phase of stalemate but might be re-initiated with a different logic 
under more favorable conditions. Changes within the regional context will be 
key to the direction of future steps. Even if there may be new efforts to find po-
litical solutions to the Kurdish Question, it seems that Turkish decision makers 
will no more accept the PKK as their counterpart. Both positive and negative 
lessons learned from the failed initiatives will be key to future peace process-
es. After the developments in Iraq and Syria within the last couple of years, 
the Kurdish Question seems to be a more regional issue than a domestic one. 
Any new peace initiative needs to take the question within a broader regional 
framework if its wants to be more effective. 
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